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The collection of essays presented in this volume is dedicated to the analysis of different theoretical and practical aspects of criticism in China and Vietnam.

The composition of the volume reveals three major points of investigation. Firstly, using a comparative framework, light is shed on some specific features of philosophical criticism in the Occident, engaging the reader in speculation on affinities and differences in critical judgment in the East Asian and Western cultural traditions. This analytical perspective is represented in the volume by Stéphane Feuillas’s introductory note, as well as by François De Gandt’s concluding essay “Tastes and Rules: Manners of Western Criticism.” Secondly, literary criticism in China is dealt with from a historical perspective in the section entitled “The Birth of Literary Judgment”, which includes two essays: François Martin’s “Judging the Man, Judging the Work” and Valérie Lavoix’s “Liu Xie’s Disenchantment: Attitudes and Duties of the Literary Critic as stated in the Chapter ‘Connoisseur’ of the Wenxin diaolong.” Thirdly a variety of modes of judgment in East Asia are discussed in the sections “On Critical Contrasts”, i.e. Romain Graziani’s “A Byway through Fauna: Some Thoughts on the Wildlife in the Zhuangzi” and Stéphane Feuillas’ “Thinking through Contrasting: The Critic of Buddhism and the Textual Strategies in Zhang Zai’s Zhengmeng”, and “On Classifying and Excluding”, that is Emmanuel Poisson’s “From Criticism to Reform of the Bureaucracy in Classical Vietnam” and Rainier Lanselle’s “Others as Fools: Criticism as Process of Exclusion.”

Due to the broad scope of the subject, it seems only natural that the authors of the essays have carefully selected their material in order to reflect the most crucial stages in the development of critical discourse in East Asian and European philosophical thought, as well as some of the most prominent problems that have hitherto not been sufficiently discussed. The scope of the investigation is laid out...
by Stéphane Feuillas in his introductory note (pp. 6-11). While he admits to the abundance of material, that is critical judgments scattered through "all fields of knowledge"1 in the East Asian tradition, he calls attention to its relative indifference towards systematizing and constructing a critical spirit. Since this introduction reflects the methodological attitude to the subject shared by the whole group of contributors, it seems necessary to cite further a passage in which the comparative framework of the analysis is explained:

[For the East Asian tradition], we should admit the absence of any theorization of the critical modality as such. It is a peculiar fact that the essentials of philosophical reflection and the conceptual equipment, which from Plato to Kant had been used to define this activity, were not present here (p. 6).

One cannot but agree with the author that the Kantian tables of categories were not formulated in the Orient. Consequently the question then is: What purpose is a similar observation supposed to serve in a volume dedicated to critical judgment, especially if we keep in mind that the subject is being discussed in Papers on Comparative Studies? Having been mentioned in the introductory remarks, the name of Kant does not appear in any of the subsequent essays. Neither Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) Critique of Judgment (1790) nor Denis Diderot’s (1713-1784) Salons (1759-1781)—most prominent works in the development of critical discourse on taste and aesthetic judgment in the Western philosophical tradition—are mentioned by any of the contributors to this volume at all, and this does not seem to be justified. It is a well-known fact that Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) articulated his scathing criticism of the Kantian tables, calling their author repeatedly “a Chinaman of Königsberg.”2 The corpus of Kant’s philosophy did not develop against an ideally constructed cultural background dating back to Plato and isolated from extra-European influences. On the contrary, it was created in the Age of Enlightenment, in an atmosphere of extraordinarily intensive cultural contacts between East and West. One of the fruits of these contacts was the Oratio de Sinarum philosophia practica (Speech on the Practical Philosophy of the Chinese) (1721) of Christian Wolff (1679-1754), a figure of extreme importance in any comparative study of critical judgment in China and the West, and a well-known precursor and opponent of Kant.3 The exact extent of Wolff’s influence on Kant, as well as the problem of assessing the relationship between Kant’s categorical imperative and Chinese philosophy, requires further investigation, and such an investigation could contribute a great deal to

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1 Feuillas, p. 6.
3 For Wolff’s role as a mediator between China and Kant, see Zempliner (1962), pp. 758-778, as well as Glasenapp (1954).
our understanding both of Kant and of Chinese philosophy. For this reason, to introduce the topic of criticism by drawing sharp contrasts between the Kantian tables and the ‘not systematizing’ critical tradition in East Asia seems to be both historically and methodologically suspect.

On the other hand, the observation by Feuillas of the absence of a ‘systematizing critical spirit’ as characteristic of Chinese philosophy is interesting, as it implicitly concerns the methodology of any comparative research. In his inaugural lecture “On the Concept of Beauty in the Chinese Theories of Art” at the University of Heidelberg in 1968, Günther Debon focussed his attention on a variety of metaphysical restrictions with which the concept mei 美 ‘beautiful’ had been confronted in Chinese aesthetics. The general meaning of mei was characterized by Debon as “sensually perceivable beauty”, as a force able to stir up emotions and agitate the mind. In the European tradition this captivating quality of beauty was regarded as a most powerful spiritual force, and in the Age of Romanticism music, the art of movement par excellence, was elevated to the highest rank in the hierarchy of arts. In China, on the other hand, aesthetic thought was oriented towards disciplining the emotions, hence the directness of sensual effect associated with the concepts of mei 美 ‘beautiful’ and se 色 ‘colour’ had to be restrained. In the course of time, a number of concepts were elaborated instead in order to delineate the aesthetic ideal, avoiding the perturbing dangers of sensibility, the most prominent among them being the concepts qi 氣 ‘pneuma’, yin 隱 ‘concealed’ and xiu 秀 ‘sublime’. Debon illustrates the development of these concepts in theory and practice with various examples, from the Wenzin diaolong 文心雕龍 (The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons) by Liu Xie 劉勰 (c. 465-522), a work he calls “the most systematic [sic!] and all-embracing poetics in China” to monochrome painting from the ninth to thirteenth centuries. However different the evaluation of sensually perceivable beauty may have been in the European and Chinese traditions both develop a systematic discourse in which sensibility is critically reflected on. Debon observes how the differences in judgment influenced the development of the whole system of the arts, the predominant arts in China being poetry, calligraphy and painting, i.e. the arts that served the cultivation of a specific learned taste and supported the ‘junzi 君子’ during his official duties. A less favourable fate shared by other arts, such as architecture, music, drama and fiction can be explained only if these are seen as elements of a system, in terms of a common denominator characteristic of the whole body of the transmitted aesthetic judgments.

This systematic view of Chinese aesthetics suggested by Debon is very fruitful for any approach to critical spirit in China. Its various aspects are well illus-

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...trated in each of the essays in the volume under review. If we try to determine the common denominator among all the critical judgments investigated in the volume, we might have to consider the specific quality of Chinese thought, which did not—as was the case with ancient Greece—regard ethics as a separate branch of philosophy, but one that permeates all fields of philosophy, including ontology, gnoseology and aesthetics. The subject is broached by François Martin in his essay “Judging the Man, Judging the Work” (pp. 13-31). The author discusses the functionality of poetic art in ancient China, focussing his attention first on the process by which the status of an official classic was established for the songs contained in the *Shijing* (The Book of Odes; c. 1000-c. 600 BC). Having been divested of their original popular meaning, the songs had come to be seen not merely as an object of judgment but “as an instrument of judgment passed on man and society.”7 Martin discusses a number of texts regarded as the earliest poetological approaches to literary art, from the “Great Preface” (Da xu) to the *Shijing* (Book of Odes) up to the *Shipin* (Evaluation of Poetry) of Zhong Hong (c. 467-518), and observes a constant tendency for poetry in Early China to be interpreted in terms of ethics.

Martin’s essay is followed by Valérie Lavoix’s discussion (pp. 34-53) of the forty-eighth chapter *Zhi yin* (An Understanding Critic) of Liu Xie’s (c. 465-522) *Wenxin diaolong* (The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons). The choice of the subject in this essay is felicitous as it is dedicated to the evaluation of literate criticism at the time of the Six Dynasties (AD 220-589), when literature gained relative freedom from serving the state. For this reason, the essays of Martin and Lavoix give a quite representative account of the main paradigm of Chinese aesthetic criticism at the time of its birth. In the chapter *Zhi yin*, Liu Xie defines the qualities he expects of a good literary critic, who alone is able to discern the hidden value of a real work of art and to perceive its inward beauty, which is concealed from vulgar minds.8 Lavoix interprets these expectations not as merely descriptive, but as part of a literary manifest of a literary critic requiring a strong sense of responsibility, as he is “called to be a witness to and a promoter of exceptional talents, a supporter and guarantor of beauty.”9 This appeal to the responsibilities of an understanding critic is an illuminating example of the strength with which the ethical criteria of judgment were applied in China, not only to the works of official writing, but to *belles lettres* as well.

Lavoix provides a detailed interpretation of what Liu Xie considers to be the major difficulties a critic is usually confronted with before he is able to fulfill his responsibility: the prejudice that lets an inexperienced mind decide in favour of the old masters in spite of the possible accomplishments in the works of the critic’s contemporaries, rivalry among literati, and, finally, ignorance. Lavoix’s

9 Lavoix, p. 46.
analysis is well articulated, but it is a pity that she does not draw any parallels between the Chinese and European traditions. In fact, the dictum of Liu Xie is strikingly reminiscent of the debates held on the same topic in the eighteenth century in Europe, during the age of Enlightenment when aesthetics had been introduced as a separate branch of philosophy. Among the twelve difficulties of aesthetic judgment discussed by Diderot in his essay “The Beautiful” (1751), ignorance and blind prejudice in favour of old masters figure as the first and the last. David Hume (1711-1776) demands that a critic should “preserve his mind free from all prejudice, and allow nothing to enter his consideration, but the very object which is submitted to his examination.”

The necessity of cultivating one’s mind regarded by Liu Xie as a *conditio sine qua non* for any sound literary judgment, his appeal to the critic’s experience, plays a crucial role in the works of Diderot, Diderot (1984), Article “Beau”, pp. 89-94. and Kant, Kant (1983), “Kritik der Urteilskraft”, Erster Teil, § 33, „Zweite Eigentümlichkeit des Geschmacksurteils“, pp. 377ff. to mention only these three most prominent *fondateurs du discours* on aesthetic judgment and taste in Europe. Liu Xie’s demand for ‘disinterestedness’ (*wu si* 無 私) on the part of the literary critic, and the concept of ‘disinterested pleasure’ (*interesseloses Wohlgefallen*) in Kant’s *Critique of Judgment*, the problem of the interrelation between ethics and aesthetics in Liu Xie’s poetics compared with the same problem in Europe, these are just a few of a large spectrum of questions forming one of the most exciting topics in comparative studies.

The *difficulty of judgment* dealt with in the contribution of Romain Graziani “A Byway through Fauna: Some Thoughts on the Wildlife in the *Zhuangzi*” (pp. 55-87) takes us back from the time of the Six Dynasties (AD 220-589) to the period of the Warring States (BC 480–221). The material analysed also suggests a change in subject, as Graziani discusses a text traditionally regarded as a major source of Daoist philosophy not a work of literary criticism. However, the insights he gains while interpreting the *Zhuangzi* are highly relevant for the topic of aesthetic judgment and aesthetic functionality.

The use of animal imagery is a major artistic tool in the philosophical system of the *Zhuangzi*. Even the compositional structure of the work indicates the importance of fauna for its authors, as the ‘stylistic strongholds’ of the text - the beginning characters of its first chapter introducing a huge fish *kun* 魚 昆 from

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14 Hume (1757), pp. 274-275.
17 *Beiming you yu qi ming wei kun* 北 冥 有 魚 其 名 為 鯤 (In the Northern Ocean there is a Fish; it is Called *kun*). See *Zhuangzi jishi*, vol. 1, p. 2.
the Northern Ocean, and the concluding passage of its last, the thirty third chapter, where the abilities of Hui Shi are compared to those of a mosquito\textsuperscript{18} - both employ animal imagery. The complicated world of animal imagery the reader comes across while moving from the huge fish to the small mosquito is the subject of interpretation in Graziani’s article.

The starting point of his analysis is consideration of the necessity to read the text of the \textit{Zhuangzi} and to approach its imagery bearing in mind the spiritual atmosphere of the time at which the text was composed, as well as the use of similar imagery by thinkers of antiquity with whom the authors of the text must have been familiar.\textsuperscript{19} The socio-centred systems of thought, such as Confucianism, Mohism and Legalism, that proclaimed the importance of definite norms of social behaviour regulated by ritual, knowledge of ethical education or by the law, measured the whole natural world according to these norms as well. The extension of the moral principles to the whole of \textit{tianxia} 天下 (the known world) including the world of animals, among other things the view that man is capable of improving wilderness and the beneficial influence of ritual music on uncultivated beings, is illustrated by Graziani with regard to a number of texts, mostly from the Confucian canon, and is seen as an element of discourse crucial for understanding the imagery in the \textit{Zhuangzi}. According to Graziani, the authors of the \textit{Zhuangzi} refuted this view of an interaction between man and the animal world that is primarily articulated in social terms as a misconception, as a product of conceited human reasoning that regards social welfare as a central value, forces the artifacts of ritual, law and music upon the world of nature, and thus irretrievably destroys the harmony between man and the vital source of the \textit{dao}. Most of the animal imagery we find in the \textit{Zhuangzi} is called upon to challenge this misconception.

One of the first passages used by Graziani is taken from the chapter “Waiwu” 外物. It is the well-known story about a divine tortoise caught by fisherman Yu Qie 余且. Using its spiritual powers, the tortoise appears in a dream to prince Yuan of Song and asks him for help. After awakening, the prince searches for the tortoise and eventually finds it. However, instead of liberating the magic animal, the prince has it dispatched and used for divination, every single one of which turns out to be true. The ‘usefulness’ of the slain tortoise is immediately reflected upon by Confucius, who frequently appears in the \textit{Zhuangzi} as a Daoist acolyte converted to the teaching of Laozi. Confucius criticizes the silliness of the tor-

\textsuperscript{18} You tiandi zhi dao guan Hui Shi zhi neng, qi you yi wen yi meng zhi lao zhe ye (Looking at the Abilities of Hui Shi [lit. “The Master of Good Deeds”] from the Perspective of the Way of the Universe, they are just like the Labour of a Mosquito or a Gnat.). See \textit{Zhuangzi jishi}, vol. 3, p. 1112.

\textsuperscript{19} The same method of interpretation is used by Graziani in his article „When Princes Awake in Kitchens: Zhuangzi’s Rewriting of a Culinary Myth” dealing with the chapter “Yang sheng zhu” 養 生 主 of the \textit{Zhuangzi} in Sterckx (2005), pp. 62-74.
toise - by appearing to the prince in a dream and being of great use for divination, it could not maintain its own life. Sophisticated reasoning, the rescue plan the tortoise resorts to, is nothing but *xiaozhi* 小知 ‘small wisdom’²⁰, which results in falling away from the natural course of the *dao*.

This episode is analyzed by Graziani in the part entitled ‘Tortures of the Tortoise: The Critique of the Divination’. As the title suggests, the tortoise episode may be interpreted as a skeptical attitude towards the use and abuse of animals in divinatory practice and as criticism of the ritual abuse of animals as a whole. However, the author goes much further, as he suggests—and this seems to be one of the major insights of his article—that it is not a natural phenomenon in the teeth of the civilizing activities of men, the suffering of a captured animal that the authors of the *Zhuangzi* are calling to the readers’ attention, but rather the failure of any human activity that aims at subsuming the natural order into the conceptual frame of social norms. As man is part of this world of nature and is in search of a harmony with universal principles that has been lost, any such activity forces him to lose a significant part of himself, to fall away from the *dao*, and that is why the *Zhuangzi* reveals the condition of man himself when speaking of the tortoise. In this sense, the meaning of the image of the tortoise is invested with is defined in terms that prove to be applicable to the whole of the bestiary in the *Zhuangzi*:

> The tortoise is not a victim of men’s conspiring. It should be interpreted as an allegory for the situation of the human world. [This allegory] shows that under the varnished cover of appearances, behind the accomplishments that are all too readily appraised, there are cracks and splits afflicting the vital activity.²¹

Graziani observes an emblematic quality of the animal figures in the *Zhuangzi*. They cannot be perceived of as belonging to some ideal reality, and they are not necessarily positive images throughout the whole text, as he demonstrates with the episode from the chapter “Xu Wugui” 徐無鬼, where the *zhiren* 真人 (authentic man), considering his position within the human community, associates himself with the fish, but discards the way of life characteristic of sheep and ants.²² On the other hand, the boundary between man and animal is not an empirical one either, as it should be rather understood in terms of mental categories, as “emblems of certain forms of the existence.”²³

It should be added that the emblematic use of animal imagery in the Chinese literary tradition was not exclusively connected with the Daoist system of

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²⁰ *Zhuangzi jishi*, p. 934.
²² *Zhuangzi jishi*, p. 865.
²³ Graziani (2005), p. 79.
thought. A well-known example may be taken from the chapter “Zheng Jian” 正 諫 of the *Shuoyuan* 説苑 by Liu Xiang 劉 向 (BC 77-76). It contains a story in which counselor Shao Ruzi 少 孺子 advises the king of Wu against his plans to conquer the state of Chu, as such a campaign might imply considerable risks for the state of Wu. Shao Ruzi does not admonish his sovereign directly, but recounts what he has just seen in the garden: A cicada drinking sweet dew did not see the mantis lurking behind its back, the mantis preying on the cicada did not notice the finch hunting nearby, and the finch who is ready to catch the mantis falls victim to a sling-shot from beneath.\(^{24}\) This emblematic use of animal imagery is employed to support the idea of the proper art of admonishing as well as the art of wise government; animal imagery is thus inscribed into a Confucian discourse with its stress on social benefit.

Both the symbolic and the emblematic uses of animal imagery seem to be universally accepted by different systems of thought in ancient China. However, the main purport of Graziani’s analysis is not to classify all the patterns of such use, but to present the animal imagery of the *Zhuangzi* as part of a systematic program that refutes the concept of social usefulness and any attempt to subsume images of nature into a humanist discourse. This systematic view is also supported by his extending of the contrastive interpretation of animal imagery onto the concept of time in the *Zhuangzi*: The golden age of harmony between man and the *dao* is considered not as a utopian construct, not as an ideal historical period like that of Yao and Shun, but as “naturalness within us”,\(^{25}\) as a concept of “how things could be, of a power drawn from the source of the vital activity.”\(^{26}\) The figure that represents the realization of this concept better than anyone else in the *Zhuangzi* is the enlightened Confucius, who cherishes the idea of leaving his disciples and friends, of being dressed in skins, of eating acorns and chestnuts and of being able to pass wild beasts and birds without frightening them.\(^{27}\) A striking contrast indeed, if one bears in mind Confucius’ statement as it is recorded in the *Lunyu* about the impossibility for him to associate with birds and animals.\(^{28}\)

Many of the key ideas in the article of Graziani are in accord with Roel Sterckx’s seminal study *The Animal and the Daemon in Early China*, where the representation of the natural world as seen in ancient Chinese texts is considered different from their counterpart in the European tradition inasmuch as they reflected the natural world not as an object of naturalist enquiry but as projections

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\(^{24}\) Cf. Liu Xiang (2000), p. 212-213. Variations of this anecdote are also to be found in *juan* 10, part 21, in Han Ying’s *Hanshi watzhuan* (pp. 359-360), and in the “Biography of King Fuchai of Wu” 夫差內 in Zhao Ye’s *Wu Yue Chunqiu* (p. 212).


\(^{26}\) Graziani (2005), p. 75.

\(^{27}\) *Zhuangzi jicheng*, chap. “Shanmu” 山木, p. 683.

\(^{28}\) *Lunyu zhengyi*, p. 1028.
of human categories upon nature, as ‘socially constructed’ perceptions. Graziani’s analysis of the emblematic and allegorical quality of style in the Zhuangzi sustains the power of imagination as a vital element in the ‘anti-utilitarian’ treatment of animal imagery, which—if we paraphrase the Sterckx’s expression above—are here ‘socially deconstructed’ and inscribed into a polemical discourse with socio-centered philosophical systems.

If we now venture to look at how the Zhuangzi is treated in contemporary Chinese Sinology, the title of the volume under review On the Difficulty of Judgment would hardly appear to be a truism. In a recent study entitled “On the Symbolic Meaning of Fish in the Zhuangzi”, Professor Wei Yixia approaches the imagery of the Zhuangzi in a way quite different from Graziani. Most interesting is the difference in discourse. Instead of speculating on the polemical dimension of the Daoist text and without drawing any parallels with works from other philosophical schools, Wei regards the concept of equality of animal and man as the central idea of the Zhuangzi. The main achievement of the Zhuangzi is seen as being its having ensured the animal world’s right to be the true mirror and teacher of the human race, as well as in having proclaimed an equal status of animal and man. Wei further considers the vision of the world in the Zhuangzi to be “a wise conception of protecting the true nature of animals, a theory that is imbued with the wisdom of ecological ethics.” This last remark enables the figure of Zhuangzi himself to join the ranks of what Sterckx calls “socially constructed perceptions”; it demonstrates that in China the mental process of socially constructing the known world is at present as real as it was in the time of the Warring States.

In conclusion, the book under review provides views on a broad range of interesting issues concerning the theory and practice of criticism in East Asia. The contrastive critical mode discussed by Graziani using the example of the Zhuangzi is further illustrated by Stéphane Feuillas in his essay on the polemical style of Zhang Zai’s (1020-1078) Zhengmeng (pp. 89-116). Emmanuel Poisson and Rainier Lanselle reflect upon critical modality in politics (Poisson’s essay on the art of administration in Vietnam, pp. 117-137) and literature (Lanselle’s contribution on Jin Shengtan’s (1610-1661) commentary on the Xixiang ji, pp. 139-

Sterckx (2002), p. 240

Other than in the European literary tradition, where, beginning with the Poetics of Aristotle (BC 384-322) up to the Imaginary of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), the indispensable role of the imaginary for a work of art has constantly been proclaimed and defended. The Chinese traditional evaluation of fiction, of what is not historically verifiable, has been much less enthusiastic. It is important to remember that in 1925 Lu Xun opened his “Zhongguo xiaoshuo shilüe” 中國小說史略 (Brief History of Chinese Fiction) with a reference to the fantastic dimension in the Zhuangzi as “contradicting the Confucian tradition”, thus observing its contrastive quality, which is chosen by Graziani to be the starting point of his analysis. See Lu Xun (1981), p. 5.

Wei Yixia (2006), p. 44.
The material chosen for the discussion is extremely informative, as it represents the mechanisms of criticism from its birth up to the Qing dynasty (1644-1911).

However, there are two areas where the volume could have been improved. First, when referring to various aspects of criticism in East Asia, the authors themselves are rather uncritical about the actual state of research on the matters discussed. For example, analyzing the interpretations of the Shiijing (Book of Odes) in terms of political ethics, François Martin does not mention Marcel Granet’s (1884-1940) pioneering study Fêtes et chansons anciennes de la Chine (1929), where the subject of the interrelation between literary and official criticism in Early China was broached and the theory of the Shiijing’s scholarly authorship refuted. In a similar manner, Stéphane Feuillas does not include in his bibliography the complete translation of the Zhengmeng into German, a translation which is supplied with many annotations and a very insightful commentary on the language and style of Zhang Zai. Another important monograph, Sally K. Church’s dissertation “Jin Shengtan’s Commentary on the Xixiang ji” (1993), especially the part “Fools” (pp. 227-242), which is dedicated to the topic studied by Rainier Lanselle, is not mentioned or included in the bibliography either.

Second, for readers who expect to find a comparative analysis of critical judgment in the Eastern and Western traditions (the series title Extrême-Orient, Extrême-Occident: Cahiers de recherches comparatives indeed suggests the possibility of such an approach), the issue may prove disappointing. Strictly speaking, there is only one passage in the book where a comparison is drawn, in the above-mentioned introductory note (p. 6), which is neither innovative nor very convincing. The last chapter of the volume, François De Gandt’s “Tastes and Rules: Manners of Western Criticism” (pp. 163-172), is a good illustration of critical discourse in the West, but it does not provide a general outline of the development of this discourse in Europe and draws no parallels with East Asian tradition. Such a comparison would certainly make a most fruitful subject for further research, and for this reason the perceived fault of the book might be considered as one of its numerous merits.

32 Chang Tsai (1996).
French Titles of the EOEO Issue

De la difficulté de juger: Quelques ressources du mode critique en Chine et au Viêt Nam

Le dépassement critique
Stéphane Feuillas

I. Naissances du jugement littéraire

Juger l’homme, juger l’œuvre
François Martin

Le désenchantement de Liu Xie. Postures et devoirs du critique littéraire selon le chapitre “Du connaisseur” du Wenxin diaolong
Valérie Lavoix

II. Contrastes critiques

Combats d’animaux. Réflexions sur le bestiaire du Zhuangzi
Romain Graziani

Penser par contraste. Critique du bouddhisme et stratégies discursives dans le Zhengmeng de Zhang Zai (1020-1078)
Stéphane Feuillas

III. Classer / exclure

De la critique à la réforme de la bureaucratie dans le Viêt Nam classique
Emmanuel Poisson

L’autre comme «imbécile»: le système clos de la critique comme opération d’inclusion/exclusion
Rainier Lanselle

IV. Regard extérieur

Le goût et les règles: les usages de la critique en Occident
François De Gandt
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